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INTRODUCTION 
The tasks of promoting justice, compensation, and reconciliation after conflict are 
challenging and can take many years to achieve. But systematic abuses of human rights 
that are not adequately addressed are a source of social unrest and often contribute to 
renewed violence. It is therefore important to (re)establish the rule of law after periods 
of conflict or authoritarianism to build sustainable peace and well-functioning states. 
The process of acknowledging, prosecuting, compensating for and forgiving past crimes 
during a period of rebuilding after conflict is commonly referred to as “transitional 
justice.” 
It is important to acknowledge that each post-conflict situation is unique, and requires 
different measures to address past wrongs.  Comparative information about how other 
countries have approached similar post-conflict justice problems can, however, help to 
design and implement an effective transitional justice strategy.  No matter what violence 
has occurred, similar questions arise in the wake of past atrocities: How can an emerging 
democracy peacefully integrate both the supporters and the victims of a former regime? 
How should it approach justice and reconciliation, war crimes, and the search for truth? 
Many countries face these difficult questions, and the answers can often have profound 
political, legal, psychological and economic consequences. 
This handbook briefly illustrates approaches that have been employed in numerous 
countries to promote post-conflict transitional justice. Past experience demonstrates that 
transitional justice mechanisms work best if they are combined in a comprehensive 
strategy: Judicial measures like trials and legal reforms, and non-judicial measures like 
truth commissions and compensation schemes can and should complement each other.  
This guide also identifies some of the difficult choices that societies must make in their 
struggle to rebuild their society and their state while confronting the legacy of the past: 
whom to hold accountable, how victims may be satisfied, and how security and justice 
sector institutions can be reformed.  The information in this handbook is only intended 
to be an overview, and each of the concepts and techniques are explored in much greater 
detail in the additional sources indicated in the appendix. 
 
Goals of Transitional Justice 
 
The basic challenge of transitional justice strategy is to effectively respond to past abuse 
in ways that:  
 
 establish the truth about what happened and why 
 acknowledge victims’ suffering  
 hold perpetrators accountable  
 compensate for past wrongs 
 prevent future abuses 
 promote social healing 
 
It is clearly a difficult task; but several techniques have been developed in countries 
transitioning from war to peace that address each of these challenges.  These include: 
 
 criminal prosecutions 
 truth commissions 
 reparations and compensation programs 
 systems for vetting abusive officials from public positions 
 
Each of these mechanisms is explained in this guide along with its purpose, elements, 
risks, and rewards.  Each may play an important part of an overall transitional justice 
plan, as determined by the specific circumstances of a conflict, the society seeking 
justice, and by popular priorities and demands. 
 
 
 
 
I.  FACTORS FOR DETERMINING APPROPRIATE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
MECHANISMS 
 
Determining which transitional justice mechanism or combination of mechanisms is 
appropriate for a given country depends on many factors and the unique circumstances 
of a period of abuse.  Are crimes widespread, or focused on one region or ethnic group? 
Are many perpetrators responsible, or only a few?  Were the crimes acts of the State, or 
those of insurgents, or both?  Are the perpetrators still more or less in power, or has 
there been a clean transition to a new government?  Does the state have sufficient 
resources to implement a justice mechanism?  Are the courts credible?  Can the state 
afford individual reparations?   
 
Depending on the answers, certain options are more viable than others.  The most 
important point is that a careful assessment must be done about the circumstances of the 
conflict and the positions and interests of the victims, leaders, and the general public 
before any transitional justice mechanism is decided.  The best way to determine 
different groups’ needs and positions is through thorough consultations and, ideally, 
public debate about different transitional justice options. 
 
With that in mind, below are some factors that affect the utility of different transitional 
justice mechanisms.  These are not concrete rules, but rather present different ways of 
looking at the issues. 
 
 Prosecutions provide the most direct form of accountability, and work best when 
there are credible courts – national, international, or hybrid – available to hold trials.  
Because the number of potential defendants implicated in past abuses is often quite 
large, and prosecuting them all would generally be beyond the financial, human and 
political capacity of the state, the number of perpetrators who can be prosecuted is 
typically small.  There must be strong political will to sustain prosecutions, which is 
often lacking when perpetrators or their political partners are still sharing power.  
Prosecutions take significant time and money to conclude, and only address the 
crimes of individual defendants.  But in many ways, successful prosecutions make 
the strongest statement against impunity and signal to victims that the new 
government is willing to make a clean break with an abusive past. 
 
 Truth Commissions are suitable for analyzing widespread (and longstanding) 
patterns of abuse, or for cases in which atrocities -- whether committed in secret by 
the State or in remote areas -- are relatively unknown.  The aim of a truth 
commission is to ascertain the facts and causes of systemic abuse in the most 
objective way possible, and not necessarily to directly punish individuals involved.  
As official investigative bodies, Truth Commissions require significant political will 
to implement, and generally are not effective unless the commissioners are truly 
independent of the parties to the conflict or abuse.  Truth commissions are not 
simply closed academic inquiries, but serve as a way for all of society to explore 
exactly what kind of abuses occurred and why, and how to prevent their recurrence 
in the future, but in a non-criminal context. They should therefore be formed on the 
basis of extensive public consultations and often work best when their activities 
include significant public outreach and engagement. 
 
 Vetting is the process of administratively excluding individuals strongly associated 
with past abuse from serving in public offices without full court proceedings.  
Vetting programs are designed to restore public trust in institutions by removing 
perpetrators from official positions, or preventing unqualified or abusive individuals 
from being appointed to government posts where they might corrupt the credibility 
and performance of a new regime. Vetting programs are useful in cases where was 
abuses were committed by government officials, such as police and military officers, 
and judicial officials who remain in government posts even after violence has 
concluded. Vetting is an administrative rather than a judicial action, and therefore 
requires a lower standard of evidence to implement.  Still, vetting must be conducted 
according to objective standards and fair procedures. 
 
 Reparations and Compensation to victims of a conflict are often the most demanded 
recourse for past violence, but the most difficult to achieve – particularly when the 
government has few resources to give as compensation. For reparations to work 
effectively, victims must be identified, their injuries must be quantified (for example, 
what is appropriate compensation for the mother of a murdered child, or of a torture 
survivor?), and resources must be available to make some form of payment or in-
kind service to the aggrieved party.  Reparations may be tied to the work of a truth 
commission to make these assessments.  Compensation may be symbolic (a 
memorial or an apology), or in-kind (such as free health or education benefits) as 
well as monetary – recognizing that no material payment can fully compensate for 
an emotional loss.  Reparations are a powerful tool for helping victims to recover 
from conflict, but can also sow division when one group is favored for reparations 
over others who may deserve them. 
 
 
 
 
II: CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
 
Criminal prosecutions are directed at individuals who bear personal responsibility for 
criminal offences committed during a period of conflict or abuse. Prosecuting 
perpetrators of mass crimes is an international legal obligation, and is often seen as a 
moral good as well as sending a strong social message that criminal acts will not be 
tolerated in the future. Prosecutions also help to avoid lawless revenge and retaliation, 
and to maintain or restore the rule of law. 
 
Key Factors for considering prosecutions 
 
Prosecuting individuals who have committed past crimes is the most direct form of 
accountability possible. Prosecutions help to reaffirm legal order and encourage trust in 
public institutions. 
 
However, prosecutions are often expensive, time consuming, and divisive, and no state 
will have adequate resources to prosecute all of the hundreds if not thousands of 
perpetrators who have committed crimes during a period of conflict.   
 
To overcome these obstacles, prosecutions in the transitional justice context are often 
only conducted for the individuals most responsible for the most serious crimes.  Not 
only are they considered more deserving of punishment than others, punishing the 
principal perpetrators can act as a deterrent for future abusers and signals an 
acknowledgment of the wrongdoing that occurred as an indication that impunity will 
not be tolerated in a new regime. 
 
Legal requirements for prosecutions 
 
International law establishes that states have a duty to prosecute the most serious 
international crimes, such as genocide, torture or violation of the laws of war.1  Still, a 
court with specific and appropriate jurisdiction must be established for proper trials to 
be conducted.  Prosecutions must be conducted in a fair and impartial manner that 
follows clearly established procedures, including the basic due process conditions 
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Fair trials must 
also protect the accused person’s right to a defense, including the right to a lawyer and 
the right to see and to rebut the evidence against them.   
 
Political obstacles to prosecutions: 
 
Prosecutions in post conflict or transitional societies often take place in fragile political 
contexts that present difficulties for establishing trials. Many times the perpetrators of 
past atrocities, or their sponsors, become part of a new government, and will be 
reluctant to promote prosecutions that may punish themselves or members of their own 
group or party.  On the other hand, if one party to a conflict prevails and initiates 
prosecutions against members of the losing faction, the losers will claim that the trials 
are acts of revenge rather than justice.  To overcome these risks, trials must be as 
independent, transparent, and objective as possible, following clear laws and fair 
procedures, administered by qualified legal professionals.  
 
Capacity needed for fair trials: 
 
Mass crimes such as crimes against humanity or genocide are difficult to investigate and 
more difficult to prove in a court of law. Prosecutors must investigate large patterns of 
abuse, which may involve many witnesses and forensic analyses, as well as establishing 
                                                
1 See, for example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Geneva 
Conventions, and the Rome Statute of the ICC, incorporate genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes into its domestic legal framework. 
complex links between commanders who ordered crimes and the soldiers who carried 
them out.  
 
Several conditions are necessary to ensure the necessary capacity and technical ability to 
investigate and prosecute systemic crimes, including: 
 
 prosecutors need to have a clear understanding of the relevant law; 
 experts must examine not only the law but also the historical, military and 
political details of the conflict; 
 sophisticated trial management techniques must handle large amounts of 
complicated evidence; 
 detailed rules of procedure and evidence must be able to handle a complicated 
trial. 
 
In many countries recovering from conflict, local court systems are not well equipped to 
handle the size and complexity of prosecutions for mass crimes.  Moreover, many 
domestic courts are seen as politically biased after periods of authoritarian rule and even 
if they have the technical capacity to take on complex cases, they are not seen as credible 
by one or more parties to the conflict. 
 
In such cases, some countries have pursued a “hybrid” model of prosecution, whereby 
local courts, lawyers, and judges are assisted by international counterparts to assist with 
trials.  International experts can bring both professional experience, knowledge of the 
evolving international jurisprudence on the subject and, as important, independence to 
legal proceedings.  There are many different models of hybrid courts to prosecute past 
atrocities, including courts in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Bosnia and Lebanon.  
Each of these courts: 
 
 are temporary in nature  
 include local and international staff working side by side  
 use a combination of national and international law. 
  
Victims’ needs and their expectations need to be acknowledged: 
 
Prosecutions mainly deal with the role of the accused. The official role of victims is 
limited to providing witness testimony in a formal – often unfamiliar - procedure. It is 
therefore crucial that victims understand the purposes and limitations of the formal trial 
procedures so that they do not feel ignored or manipulated by the process, and are not 
disappointed by false expectations of the outcome.  More important, victims and 
witnesses who do participate in politically sensitive trials must be adequately protected 
so that they do not become victims of revenge from the accused, or suffer emotional or 
social harm as a result of the information they contribute. 
 
Combining prosecutions with other transitional justice mechanisms: 
 
Given the limited scope of prosecutions to individual perpetrators of the most serious 
crimes, it is often desirable to conduct trials in conjunction with other forms of 
transitional justice mechanisms that address victims’ needs more directly and address 
larger patterns of abuse.  In this regard, a truth commission may work side by side to a 
tribunal, so that the two mechanisms can offer a more complete accounting of the causes 
and consequences of a conflict.  
 
It is important that combined mechanisms’ relationships are clearly defined so that they 
do not increase confusion, compete for the same information or evidence and that they 
do not discourage submissions to the truth mechanism for fear of subsequent 
prosecutions. In some countries, truth commissions have preceded prosecutions, 
gathering and preserving evidence while the technical capacity and political will for 
trials develops.  In others, they have proceeded concurrently. In some places, truth 
commissions have referred cases and evidence to prosecutors; in others, they have been 
barred from doing so.  And in some countries, only after individuals have been 
prosecuted has society moved to a broader truth commission process.   
 
Also, as trials focus on the guilt and punishment of individual defendants but do not 
rehabilitate their victims, compensation schemes may also be important to begin to 
redeem victims and help them to recover from their loss. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Criminal justice is part of the response to massive human rights violations and works 
best if combined with other mechanisms of transitional justice. If domestic prosecutions 
are possible, they can signal a break with the past, foster renewed public trust in 
institutions and restore the dignity of victims. At the same time, prosecutions generally 
face many hurdles and require significant resources and a high commitment to fairness, 
transparency and public consultations. A clear prosecutorial strategy helps to make the 
best use of limited resources. The next chapter addresses how domestic capacity can be 
combined and complemented with international efforts. 
 
 
 
 
III: TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
 
1.  What is a Truth Commission? 
 
Truth commissions are official investigative bodies comprised of independent experts 
that are responsible for investigating and reporting on patterns of human rights abuses 
over a certain period of time in a particular country or in relation to a particular conflict. 
Truth commissions allow victims, their relatives and perpetrators to give evidence of 
human rights abuses, providing an official forum for their accounts.  
Key characteristics.  Truth commissions generally: 
 are created by official law or decree with wide powers of investigation; 
 exist for a designated period of time (typically 6 months - 2 years); 
 have a specific mandate identifying the acts and time period to be investigated; 
 examine not just individual acts, but patterns of abuse and the institutional and 
societal factors that facilitated their occurrence; 
 are led by a diverse group of independent experts (typically 3 - 9 individuals); 
 adopt formal rules of procedure to conduct investigations; 
 interview witnesses, conduct site visits, and hold hearings; and  
 produce and disseminate a final report, including conclusions and 
recommendations on how to prevent future abuses. 
 
The main objectives of truth commissions is to officially acknowledge past abuses, 
recognize the suffering of victims, identify patterns of violence and more specific acts of 
wrongdoing, and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of violence in the 
future.  Truth commissions may also identify individuals responsible for acts of violence 
and even recommend cases for prosecution. However, truth commissions cannot be 
expected to find the ultimate truth for all individual cases.  Truth commissions are 
therefore usually only one of many mechanisms of transitional justice and should be 
part of a larger strategy to build sustainable peace and a political order respecting the 
human rights of all. Trials, reparations and reforms may also be part of a complete 
program of justice and reconciliation. 
 
2.  Why establish a truth commission? 
 
Truth commissions are established to uncover the facts about broad patterns of abuse to 
better understand and acknowledge the scope of atrocities committed, and to address 
changes that need to be made to prevent future abuse.  They are different than criminal 
investigations in that they are focused on both victims and perpetrators – discovering 
what abuses were committed against whom and why – rather than a prosecutor’s focus 
on individual perpetrators who committed specific crimes.  Some of the main reasons to 
establish a truth commission include: 
 
a. To establish the facts about violations of the past -- Victims and societies have an 
internationally recognized right to know the truth about the past.2  The first step to 
fulfill the right to an effective remedy, guaranteed in international law, is a credible and 
objective investigation of abuses. 
 
b. To acknowledge past abuses, a contested or denied history -- Truth commissions 
make it more difficult to deny that abuses occurred, and help to signal a formal break 
with an abusive past.  In some cases, the facts and nature of abuses has been hidden 
from the public; in others, each group’s version of the truth is limited to its own 
victimization, denying the reality of abuses committed against others.  Objective 
investigations can help a society to acknowledge (if it’s the case) that there were victims 
and perpetrators on more than one side.  They can help society confront and address the 
legacy of its troubled history in a comprehensive way and understand what, how and 
why abuses occurred.  
 
c. To restore victims’ dignity and to respond to some of their concrete needs -- Truth 
commissions provide a public forum for victims by allowing and assisting them to find 
and tell the truth. Official recognition of past abuse can be an important form of healing 
for victims who want they suffering to be acknowledged and their voices to be heard.  
Truth commissions can also address and appreciate victims’ needs, such as their need to 
clarify the legal status of disappeared relatives in order to gain access to social benefits, 
etc. 
 
d. To prevent future abuses by recommending reparations or institutional reforms 
and by reaffirming social norms -- By initiating and informing public debate, truth 
commissions can reaffirm common social norms and commit to a democratic order that 
respects the human rights of all.  Past truth commissions have suggested ways to rebuild 
                                                
2 “Irrespective of any legal proceedings, victims and their families have the imprescriptible right to know 
the truth about the circumstances in which violations took place and, in the event of death or disappearance, 
the victims' fate.” Principle 4 of the Updated the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human 
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/sessions/61/lisdocs.htm (accessed July 8, 2008). 
a political and economic order that makes future abuses less likely. They may 
recommend legal and institutional reforms. The vast amount of data that they collect 
allows them to outline institutional weaknesses that may have contributed to past 
abuses and to prescribe priorities of reform. They are also well suited to design the 
general outline of a reparations program. 
 
e. To promote accountability and justice -- Truth commissions and prosecutions are 
complementary mechanisms: truth commissions focus on the patterns of abuses, 
whereas prosecutions assign individual criminal responsibility. Truth commissions can 
help make justice prevail but they do not exonerate the state from its obligation to 
conduct judicial investigations in courts.  However, a truth commission may foster an 
environment that facilitates criminal prosecutions, vetting processes or other forms of 
accountability, and can establish and preserve evidence that can be used in the pursuit 
of criminal accountability. 
 
f.  To reconcile the society -- Some truth commissions were specifically set up to foster 
reconciliation, but the relationship between truth and reconciliation is often unclear. 
Reconciliation is normally a very long and complex process.  Truth commissions do not 
guarantee reconciliation, nor can they impose forgiveness by individuals. But on a 
societal level, reconciliation may indeed be facilitated by attempts to find the truth and 
by stimulating deliberations on how to face the future.  By engaging all of society in an 
examination of what happened, truth commissions can open the public dialogue on 
these difficult issues that is generally needed for reconciliation to follow. 
 
3.  Why do some countries decide not to establish a truth commission? 
Truth commissions are not appropriate for all situations and there may be sound 
reasons not to create one, or to delay its establishment. There are several concerns 
associated with a truth commission: 
 
 Fear that sensitive investigations may stir renewed violence or harm a 
demobilization and disarmament program; 
 Security risks for commissioners, victims and/or witnesses, especially if a 
conflict is ongoing; 
 A lack of political interest or a lack of pressure from civil society; 
 Politicians may have an interest in a truth commission only to delegitimize their 
opponents or to delegate responsibility for difficult tasks, or to avoid pursuing 
criminal prosecutions; 
 Insufficient capacity: implementing countries may lack needed resources 
 Victims may prefer alternative mechanisms to promote reconciliation. 
 
To make the decision whether or not a truth commission should be established, broad 
consultations with victims and civil society should be held.  If critical resources, political 
will, or impartiality are lacking, it may be better not to convene a truth commission at 
all, rather than to initiate a process that will not be able to fulfill its goals. 
 
Features and Activities of Truth Commissions 
 
If a commission is to be established, many strategic decisions need to be taken. To design 
the most appropriate design for a given context, it is advisable to involve relevant 
stakeholders and civil society and to seek the cooperation of institutions with expertise 
from past truth commissions. This section briefly presents common features and 
activities of truth commissions. 
 
Establishing a truth commission:  Truth commissions can be established by the 
executive branch of government (by a decree), by the legislative branch or by an 
agreement between the government and armed opposition, sometimes followed by 
subsequent legislation.  
 
The mandate of the truth commission:  A truth commission’s mandate provides the 
framework of its subsequent work. It should be tailored to meet the specific needs and 
circumstances of the country and it should be drafted through a consultative and 
transparent process.  
 
The following is a limited list of elements commonly contained in the mandate of a truth 
commission, including its:  
 
 objectives  
 legal authority to interview witnesses and collect testimony, including in some 
cases the power to compel such testimony 
 types of violations the commission will investigate 
 time period to be investigated 
 time granted to the commission to complete its work 
 authority to issue recommendations 
 
The composition of the commission and its staff:  Selecting the commissioners and staff 
will impact whether the commission is seen as a legitimate body. Much depends not 
only on Commissioners’ individual qualifications and backgrounds, but also on the 
procedure through which they are selected.  Based on best practices: 
 
 A Commission’s mandate should be established before Commissioners are 
selected. It should outline the process of selection and it should list the 
characteristics of ideal commissioners. 
 Among other criteria, commissioners should be competent, impartial, and 
independent. In some cases, commissioners are chosen primarily because of their 
known integrity and standing in society. 
 The commission should be a diverse representation of the society and should be 
gender balanced. 
 The commission can be composed of national citizens, internationals or both. 
Internationals often help to lend a sense of impartiality to a commission. 
 A secretariat, and sometimes regional offices, will have to be established to 
ensure the commission can complete its work in a professional, comprehensive 
and timely fashion. Field offices help to ensure that victims have access to the 
commission. 
 
Consultations and public outreach:  
 A transparent and consultative process will not only help to inspire public 
confidence, it will ensure that the commission does not miss the most important 
part of truth and will also attract more domestic and international support.  
 Significant time should be calculated to receive public input on the mandate.3  
 It is critically important to foster meaningful relationships with civil society and 
the media. The relationship with local NGOs can be very fruitful but should not 
be taken for granted. For instance, local NGOs may provide training, access to 
                                                
3 Because of the benefits from broad public consultations, peace negotiators should not be too prescriptive 
when including provisions of a truth commission in a peace agreement. 
their information, introductions to local communities, and they may be a 
significant partner in lobbying the government.  They are also often an important 
source of collected evidence for the commission, and can play a valuable role in 
facilitating victim and general public participation in the truth commission 
process. 
 
Hearings and Statement-taking: statement-takers are often the only direct contact 
victims have with the commission. They need to be well-prepared for their challenging 
job, since they will need to respect and listen to victims’ accounts while at the same time 
completing the technical requirements of the data collection process. They should ensure 
that statements are collected in a supportive and safe environment. Increasingly, truth 
commissions have also conducted public hearings. Countries such as Timor-Leste have 
opted for community-based sessions to involve local communities. In some countries, 
selected hearing have provided an opportunity to examine the role of various sectors – 
such as the media, the educational system, religious leadership, the legal and medical 
professions, etc. – not in directly committing grave human rights abuses, but in helping 
to make them possible through their actions and inactions.  The publicity reduces the 
possibilities of denying past abuses and increases the visibility of the commission. But 
considerations of security, resources and due process should be taken into account.  
 
Research and investigation: research and investigation can link individual case 
investigations with thematic research. These activities often need considerable resources 
and expertise. The more powers a commission has, the more robust their investigative 
capacities should be.  Several past truth commissions have used sophisticated 
information management systems to manage and record the information from its 
investigations. These tools can identify patterns of abuses and may provide an accurate 
analysis and estimates of the total number of victims. Database systems, however, are 
resource intensive and require coders and professional statisticians.  More broadly, 
commission research staff may include historians, anthropologists, investigators, legal 
analysts, and other specializations as appropriate. 
 
Victim and witness support mechanisms:  truth commissions often deal with sensitive 
issues. Every effort should be made to avoid re-traumatizing victims. Their views must 
be taken into account to devise effective protection mechanisms. In addition, states have 
specific responsibilities in relation to child victims and victims of sexual violence.  
 
Final report: reports are often the most visible legacy of the commission and they can 
affect how the public understands its national history. Final reports include the facts and 
patterns of abuse as determined by the commission, analysis of responsibility, 
information on the victims;4 recommendations for steps to deal with the legacy of the 
abuses.  Past truth commissions have issued short summaries of their final reports, 
newspapers have sometimes published series of excerpts and some commissions 
designed special versions for children and students. Artistic means have also been used 
in a powerful ways.5 Victims should always get a copy of the commission’s report. 
 
Truth Commissions: Common Challenges and Suggestions to Address them 
                                                
4 Some truth commissions have included in their final report a list of all victims identified, or even a brief 
account of the facts of the case of each victim. 
5 For instance, the Peruvian commission issued a book containing powerful photographs documenting the 
period under investigation. An exhibition was later held in the national museum.  Jeremías Gamboa and 
others, Yuyanapaq = Para Recordar: Relato Visual Del Conflicto Armado Interno En El Perú, 1980-2000 (Lima,: 
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 
2003). 
 
The truth commission may be subject to intimidation and political pressure:  In many 
post-conflict transitions, the “truth” may be inconvenient for many people in power.  
This may lead to destruction of evidence or preventing access to files, along with 
intimidation of witnesses and victims. In addition, perpetrators and their political allies 
may try to pressure the commission to adopt a biased approach to the facts, exploring 
the abuses of certain individuals and facts but not others. 
 
To help alleviate these challenges, those establishing a truth commission may seek the 
support of a broad base through public consultations, select as commission members 
respected leaders with proven integrity, an ensure credible security to support the 
process.  It also helps to provide real penalties for interference with the commission’s 
work. 
 
Accused perpetrators might demand amnesty:  In order to secure the meaningful 
cooperation of accused perpetrators, it is sometimes thought that offering amnesty in 
exchange for such cooperation might lead to the revelation of the truth. While the “truth 
for amnesty” formula was used in South Africa, it was backed by a credible threat of 
prosecution of those who did not apply for amnesty or did not present the entire truth in 
their amnesty application.   
 
Amnesty for the most serious international crimes – such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and torture -- is prohibited by international law.  Even with amnesty for so-
called lesser crimes, in the absence of a real threat of prosecution, accused perpetrators 
will not feel compelled to cooperate with the truth commission.  Because the post-
conflict environment in which a truth commission functions, however, is often 
characterized by a weak justice system, the conditions for a successful “truth for 
amnesty” approach are seldom met.  If amnesty for lesser abuses is offered, it is 
advisable to offer it only to individuals who have cooperated by giving specific, truthful 
information and not to an entire group of potential perpetrators.  Victims should be 
notified and have a right to challenge the amnesty decision before a judicial authority.  
Consideration may also be given to making amnesty conditional on the perpetrator 
performing a appropriate act of remorse and restitution. 
 
The public may have unrealistic expectations: While some truth commissions have 
attempted to document the case of every victim, and have included a comprehensive list 
of victims in their final report, commissions operate under time constraints and the 
desire for an expeditious process imposes limits on the number of cases a commission 
can investigate. This can be very disappointing for victims and their families, who often 
seek specific truth about their personal case.  Victims also often expect reparations, 
which truth commissions are neither mandated nor resourced to give.  Being identified 
as a victim by the truth commission, however, may formally qualify such individuals for 
subsequent victim compensation without having to go through the process of re-proving 
their cases.  
 
Public outreach that sets realistic expectations is vital. Local victim support groups, local 
NGOs, religious institutions or other organizations can play a valuable role in 
communicating this information and helping to establish those expectations.  
Recommendations regarding reparations may be included in the truth commission’s 
report.  
 
The commission’s recommendations may not be implemented:  Issuing comprehensive 
recommendations for reparations or reform is relatively easy for a truth commission.  
Government implementation is hard.  Even when a truth commission mandate requires 
that a government adopt its recommendations, there are often few resources available 
for the task, and political will may erode as time passes.  
 
Mechanisms for follow-up should therefore be considered even before a truth 
commission is established. A successor body can be designated to monitor the 
implementation of the recommendations, to continue investigations and/or to preserve 
the archives. This can be an ad hoc body or an existing institution (such as a national 
human rights institution).  Civil society should also be encouraged to monitor and 
follow-up the implementation of the commission’s recommendations. A trust fund may 
also be created in advance to pay for the commission’s most important 
recommendations. 
 
Resources may be limited: Truth commissions are generally much cheaper than large-
scale prosecutions. The average budget of recent truth commissions ranged between 5 
and 10 million USD. Often, several hundred staff members need to be hired. If they 
contribute to prevent future abuses and violence, their costs may seem modest. 
However, raising the necessary funds can be challenging. 
 
To avoid failure because of resource constraints, the national government should take 
the lead in financing the truth commission, in large part to signal its commitment to 
reform. But the international donor community will often contribute funds if it trusts the 
commission will be productive and fair.  In addition, international partners can provide 
in-kind expertise, training or material support to improve the effectiveness of a 
commission.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Truth commissions can foster a common understanding and acknowledgement of an 
abusive past, and if they are effectively embedded in a comprehensive justice 
perspective, they can provide a foundation for building a strong and lasting peace.  
Carefully structuring and implementing a truth commission process is crucial to its 
having this positive impact. 
 
 
 
 
IV: VETTING (Lustration): Reforming Government Institutions’ Personnel 
Vetting refers to the reform of an institution’s personnel by removing or excluding 
abusive, corrupt or unqualified employees.  Vetting programs focus particularly on 
reforming the police, prison services, the army and the judiciary because they are often 
responsible for past human rights abuses and are otherwise institutions that the public 
must rely on to prevent future abuse.  In some countries, screening and excluding 
people based on evidence of their involvement in past abuses has also included 
candidates for elected office, school teachers, senior financial officials and others. 
Key Characteristics of Vetting 
Vetting is based on the assumption that fair and efficient public institutions are crucially 
important to prevent future human rights abuses. Vetting processes are therefore 
undertaken to (re) establish public trust in institutions, increase their legitimacy and 
efficiency in delivering services to all citizens; and to signal the break with the abusive 
past.   
Vetting is generally less expensive and less complex than large-scale criminal 
prosecutions, but still provides a form of individual accountability for those who were 
responsible for violations, or who should have prevented them but did not, and where 
undertaken, generally addresses a far larger number of cases than will be the subject of 
any criminal proceedings. 
Vetting aims at excluding from certain positions of public office those who: 
 are responsible for past human rights violations; or 
 hold anti-constitutional views or are involved in terrorist groups or organized 
crime. 
 
There are two basic forms of vetting processes: 
 Retrospective Review: Current employees are screened to determine their 
suitability for public service. A reviewing panel has to receive adequate evidence 
to prove that a certain employee should be removed based on their implication 
in past abuses.  
 
 Prospective Appointment and Reappointment Review: For relevant positions, current 
employees are required to re-apply for their positions and be vetted for possible 
involvement in past abuses, possibly in addition to a review of other 
qualifications, and new candidates for those positions must apply and be subject 
to the same vetting process.  Reappointment procedures alleviate the stigma but 
are more intrusive than review procedures. 
  
Based on either of these processes, individuals who are well qualified and have not 
contributed to abuses may receive a certificate that allows them to begin or continue 
employment. Others may be employed for a probation period.   Those who are found to 
have played a significant role in past abuse may 
 be excluded from a certain type of position; 
 be banned from promotion or benefits or 
 be banned from all types of public employment for a certain period of time. 
  
In extreme circumstances, an individual may be permanently banned from all types of 
public employment. 
The criteria for excluding someone from public office must always be established with a 
view to the context. These criteria should be transparent and as clearly defined as 
possible.  Vetting should not be used to purge people on the basis of party affiliation, or 
else the vetting process itself can undermine respect for the rule of law by the new 
government. To be fair, vetting processes should assess individual conduct. 
Vetting Processes: Common Challenges and Suggestions to Address them 
Institutional reform is a difficult endeavor. Transitional or post-conflict societies face 
many challenges that affect vetting processes. These include: 
 scarce resources 
 weak state institutions 
 an overstaffed and inefficient bureaucracy 
 strong political resistance to reform 
 a weak or incomplete legal framework 
 nepotism and corruption in government appointments 
  
In addition, vetting processes often face many practical obstacles: 
 personnel records may not be available or they may have been falsified; 
 it may be difficult to find non-corrupt and impartial persons to conduct the 
vetting; 
 qualified replacement candidates of integrity may be hard to find; 
 other complex aspects of institutional reform often need to be simultaneously 
pursued (such as oversight and disciplinary procedures, reform of the legal 
framework, changing symbols, infrastructural improvements, salaries, etc.) 
  
When planning and implementing a vetting process, the following difficulties might 
arise. Useful strategies can be developed to cope with these potential challenges: 
Abuse of power: 
Those who control the vetting process have enormous influence over the lives of those 
who are screened. The careers and reputation of the employees can be severely affected. 
To prevent the misuse of power in the vetting process: 
 Officials reviewing employees and candidates must have the highest integrity. 
They should be representative of the population, have a clearly defined mandate 
and adhere to a code of ethics 
 Usually, screening programs should not be administered from within 
institutions, but by a specially created mechanism, such as an independent, 
impartial commission. 
 Vetting commission members should be irremovable during the vetting process 
except where they are found in violation of the integrity and neutrality standards 
to which they are expected to adhere.  Arrangements for the security of vetting 
officials may also be necessary. 
  
Fairness and Due Process: 
A vetting procedure is not a criminal trial before a court of law. But the loss of one’s job 
can be perceived as a “life sentence” if the procedure is not fair.  Therefore a certain 
degree of due process is required: 
 All employees should have the right to see the results of the investigation. 
 The burden should be on the vetting body to prove (albeit to lower standard of 
proof than in a criminal trial) the information that disqualifies the employee or 
applicant. 
 It must be possible to appeal to an independent body to ask for a review of an 
adverse decision. 
 As the retrospective review model involves singling out individuals and 
punishing them (through dismissal from their jobs) for their past activity, it may 
require providing the individual a higher level of due process protections.  The 
prospective model will require vetting a larger number of cases, but since it 
treats all applicants and re-applicants equally in evaluating their qualifications 
for future employment, it may permit a somewhat lower standard of due process 
and more expedited review of cases. 
  
Risk of removing too many needed employees: 
Large-scale vetting processes can remove employees whose expertise is needed if the 
criteria are not carefully defined. Moreover, broad vetting processes risk creating a pool 
of discontented unemployed individuals who might undermine the transition and join 
unlawful activities.  This is particularly problematic when the individuals are members 
of the police or military who may have weapons and the training to use them against 
civilians or the new government.  To avoid these problems: 
 Assess both the risks of removal as well as the pool of replacement candidates. 
 Ensure the process is fair and transparent. 
 Provide training or alternative livelihoods in other jobs for those removed from 
government institutions, and re-training as appropriate for those who remain. 
 Consider appointment or re-appointment on for probationary period, during 
which time vetting officials can receive additional evidence and employees can 
be evaluated on the basis of their performance and adherence to the values of 
human rights and the rule of law. 
  
Risks of political interference:  
Vetting processes are extremely sensitive and determine which political leaders, former 
combatants, or members of ethnic, religious or political groups are disqualified for 
appointed or elected office.  As a consequence, the likelihood of attempts at political 
interference, intimidation or bribery of vetting officials is high.  Some steps to reduce 
this risk include the following: 
 A formally negotiated mandate helps to alleviate this risk. If a peace agreement 
includes specific provisions requiring personnel reform, it places a clear 
obligation on the parties and can help to avoid long periods of uncertainty.  
Similarly, while some discretion must be left to vetting officials, the clarity of 
legislation establishing the process can reduce the potential for manipulation. 
 Effective and transparent public information and consultations with civil society 
are essential to foster public trust and the sustainability of the efforts. 
 If political will is weak, a well-coordinated internationalized process may offer 
necessary leverage and impartiality.  But domestic leadership is in most instances 
preferable to a purely international process. 
 Combining an institutional reform strategy with other transitional justice 
initiatives makes a strategy more effective and legitimate. 
  
Conclusion 
Vetting can be used to regain the population’s trust in institutions and serves to prevent 
the recurrence of violence stemming from public institutions. If vetting is carefully 
planned, adequately resourced, mandated and overseen, it can contribute to improve the 
institutions’ commitment to serve all citizens and to safeguard the rule of law. 
 
 
 
V: REPARATIONS 
Reparations are either payments or services given to victims of past abuse as 
compensation for the harm they or their loved ones have suffered during a period of 
conflict. International law recognizes that victims of systematic human rights abuses are 
entitled to prompt, adequate and effective reparation and states have a duty to provide 
comprehensive reparations. Reparations are intended to recognize and repair harm, 
restore victims’ dignity and rebuild trust and solidarity among communities that have 
been torn apart by violence. 
In post-conflict environments it is important to recognize that no payments can ever 
fully compensate for torture or killing, and the reality that many governments cannot 
afford large cash payments to thousands of victims. Reparations range from purely 
symbolic acts to mostly material benefits.  
Among the different types or reparations are: 
 Restitution: May include return of property or other measures to re-establish the 
situation before the violation was committed. 
 
 Compensation: May include the payment of economically assessable damages, 
pensions, or smaller symbolic payments as an acknowledgment of one’s 
victimization. 
 
 Rehabilitation: May include medical and psychological care, establishment of 
rehabilitation centers, administrative rehabilitation (such as the dismissal of false 
charges or the restoration to a job from which one was dismissed for political 
reasons), legal and social services, and educational benefits. 
 
 Symbolic Measures: May include State apologies, construction of memorials, re-
naming of streets, establishment of commemoration days, dignified re-burials, 
and waivers for job training and educational fees. 
  
Symbolic and material reparations are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they should 
complement each other: 
 Symbols show respect and recognition. But alone, symbols may not be taken 
seriously and victims may demand at least some concrete material solutions. 
 
 On the other hand, purely material measures can be perceived as a way of 
buying victims’ acquiescence in a weak overall transitional justice policy, in 
contrast not only with trials, truth commissions and vetting, but also with the 
many symbolic reparations noted above which are more societal in their impact. 
 
Reparations can be directed at individuals or at communities, groups or regions. 
 Individual reparations recognize the individual harm done to citizens but it is 
sometimes difficult to fairly identify all victims. 
 
 Collective reparations avoid the need to categorize victims into different classes 
but they may fail to recognize the intimate nature of each crime. They may also 
benefit perpetrators and they can easily be confused with general development 
projects. 
  
It is also possible to combine individual and collective reparations. In Timor- Leste, for 
example, war widows or victims of sexual violence received individual scholarships for 
their children. When mothers picked up their benefits, they would go to a community 
center where they could also receive health care and other services. 
Reparations are most effective if they fit into a coherent overall plan of transitional 
justice including, for example, revelation of the truth or the removal of perpetrators form 
public institutions. 
Reparations Programs: Common Challenges and Suggestions to Address them 
Despite the great need for reparations after a conflict, it is difficult to satisfy the demand. 
When planning reparations programs, strategies should be developed to deal with the 
challenges that are most likely to arise: 
1. Beneficiaries need to be identified, and re-victimization must be avoided: 
The number of victims is substantial after widespread human rights violations and it is 
challenging to decide what classes of victims can be treated equally.  To implement an 
equitable reparations program: 
 First, the type of violations need to be defined, and then different types of 
violations should be linked to appropriate forms of reparations. 
 
 Sensitivity must be shown to victims to ensure they feel safe in disclosing what 
happened to them during a conflict, and do not relive painful memories only to 
find that no benefits are forthcoming, and also to ensure that proposed 
reparations respond to the needs of various groups of victims. 
 
 The requirements to qualify as a beneficiary must be carefully chosen. For 
instance, requirements of medical records can exclude many victims with poor 
access to health care or psychological examinations can mean revisiting 
traumatic experiences.  In addition, where an individual has already been 
formally identified as a victim by a State truth commission, that should be 
sufficient to qualify for subsequent reparations. 
 
 The determination of victim status should be made on a neutral basis in 
accordance with clearly articulated standards. 
  
2. A reparations program may lack political support or resources: 
Proposals for reparations programs mostly take place in contexts with weak institutions, 
scarce resources, a fragile political setting, and low levels of trust among citizens and 
between them and their institutions. On the other hand, victims have suffered harm for 
which even the best funded program will be inadequate and fail to bring loved ones 
back to life. 
Devising a strategy from the outset can help to cope with these challenges: 
 Political will must be fostered and sustained in order to realize a program that is 
perceived as legitimate and truly affects the quality of life of victims. A strong 
coalition, including victims groups and their allies both inside and outside the 
country, can help to promote and defend the program. 
 
 Legitimacy is gained if the public understands the rationale and the limits of the 
program. 
 
 International actors may help in creating a just and fair victim registry or provide 
other types of technical assistance in the design and implementation of the 
program. 
  
3. Reparations can be perceived as a bribe to silence victims’ demands for other forms 
of justice:  
If well-designed, reparations are an acknowledgement of past violations and the state’s 
responsibility for harm. However, if reparations are carried out in isolation from other 
mechanisms of justice, there is a serious risk that they may be perceived as a tool to buy 
victim’s silence. 
 Victims should not be forced to choose between reparations and the right to 
know the truth or the right to justice.  
 
 Reparations isolated from other initiatives may allow increased denial of 
wrongdoings and may be counter-productive to the goal of sustainable peace. 
Reparations are most meaningful if they are accompanied with efforts to find the 
truth, institutional reforms and measures to hold perpetrators accountable.  This 
may include arrangements through which perpetrators are obliged to contribute 
to a reparations fund. 
 
 
4.  The respective roles of truth commissions and reparations programs may be 
confusing to victims: 
 Truth commissions can compile important information for the design of a 
reparations program and link truth-finding with reparations. The truth 
commission is the obvious place to decide what atrocities have been committed 
and by and against whom.  A truth commission should, however, not be the 
agent of the reparations program. This may skew and overly complicate the 
truth-finding process. A truth commission can recommend the general scheme of 
reparations but a different body should then administer the program and decide 
individual reparations cases.   
 
 If a truth commission is currently planned, the drafters of its mandate should 
already consider the implications of the commission’s mandate for the 
reparations program. It may be helpful to consult a reparations expert when 
drafting the commission’s mandate. 
 
 A reparations program may want to incorporate victims into the program who 
have not testified to the truth commission.  Alternatively, providing information 
about one’s case to the truth commission may be established as a requirement to 
qualify for a subsequent reparations program.  As noted earlier, effective public 
information will be essential to inform victims and the public in general of the 
procedures and mandates of each body. 
 
Conclusion 
Where substantial and irreparable harm has been inflicted, even the best reparations 
program may fall short of victims’ needs and expectations. But having no concrete 
reparations may undermine all other efforts of transitional justice. Because reparations 
have a direct effect on victims’ daily lives, as well as on society, they have a significant 
potential to contribute to the building of sustainable peace. 
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